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Abstract
In the contemporary world the mad nuclear arms race 
is high on the political agenda of most neo-cons, super-
patriots, religious fanatics and arms dealers. Throughout 
the nuclear era, the conventional wisdom has been that 
one state’s nuclear acquisition has driven its adversaries 
to follow suit but it is not always the case and instead, 
the primary security factor driving nuclear weapons 
proliferation today is the disparity in conventional 
military power. This is likely to continue in the future, 
with profound consequences for which states do and 
don’t seek nuclear weapons. As proliferation begets 
proliferation, the analysis of reasons why states have 
sought nuclear weapons remained a central theme of the 
whole aspect. Several theories-traditional and modern, 
exist today with their arguments but no single theory 
is in a position to prove itself as the sole influencing 
factor which makes it difficult for academician and 
policymakers to forecast-why states start nuclear 
weapons programmes or refrain from it. With these facts 
and factors in the background the paper aims to analyze 
various existing motivational theories / influencing 
factors to provide new insight and to be helpful to 
analysts and policy makers who deal with potential 
current or future proliferating states. Only by knowing 
why states behave like they do, effective policies to 
influence this behaviour can be made. 
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INTRODUCTION
Peace among nations became a necessary condition for 
mankind’s survival since the dropping of nuclear bombs 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. It is true that 
since then there has been no world wars, it is also true 
that nuclear weapons have been developed and deployed 
in part to deter such a conflict. The experiences of its 
use were more than sufficient to prevent all the nations 
possessing this new technology from any actual use of 
it under any circumstances. This nuclear revolution, 
in post World War phase, has forced great powers to 
behave in a careful and restrained manner and to accept 
a compromise, which in pre-nuclear times would surely 
have been unacceptable (Singh, 2005). There is no doubt 
in the fact that it is an extraordinary technological and 
military achievement and considered a great moments of 
history, it did not stop further research on atomic energy. 
In post-war period many scientists turned their attention 
from atomic weapons to the peaceful uses of atomic 
energy but most people/nations continued to believe that 
it can be used both ways-for destruction in war and for 
development during peace. Since the advent of nuclear 
weapons, there have been dozens, if not hundreds of 
projections by government and independent analysts 
trying to predict horizontal and vertical proliferation 
across the world. Various studies examined which 
countries would acquire nuclear weapons, when this 
would happen, how many weapons the superpowers as 
well as other countries would assemble, and the impact 
these developments might have on world peace (Yusuf, 
2009). However, its proliferation is a timely reminder 
26Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
Dynamics of Nuclear Going Theories: Problems and Prospect  
of the flaws in both the methodologies and theories they 
employed, over the decades.
In the context, the likelihood of the use of nuclear 
weapons for political ends was considered extremely 
high. It came from the realization that nuclearisation 
among most Asian rivals could cause one or both sides 
to contemplate suicidal moves and increase the fears of 
the use of nuclear weapons (Bracken, 1999). The “mad 
ruler” scenario was frequently mentioned in recent years 
as was the concern with an abrupt regime collapse in 
dictatorial systems like North Korea. Others argued that 
countries would be likely to pursue nuclear policies 
that would lead them to develop operational first strike 
capabilities in a quest to attain regional supremacy. In 
the circumstances there was an overwhelming belief that 
developing country proliferation would raise the specter 
of nuclear war. American analyst Joseph Cirincione in 
his book, Bomb Scare, pointed to India-Pakistan crises 
and a conflict over Taiwan as examples of situations 
where an escalation to the nuclear level may be swift and 
uncontrollable (Cirincione, 2007). The two sides found 
themselves embroiled in one limited war and one near-
war crisis under the nuclear umbrella in 1999 and 2001-
02 respectively (Chari, Cheema, & Cohen, 2007). Another 
American Michael Krepon, a noted theorist, has also 
supported the view that if the crisis has potential for a 
loss of face or a loss of territory, the prospective loser will 
seek to change the outcome.  
1. PREVAILING NUCLEAR MOTIVATION 
THEORIES
Even today, it is still unclear among academics and 
policymakers why exactly states start nuclear weapon 
programmes or refrain from them. What makes nuclear 
weapons attractive or unattractive to the leadership of 
any state? In the context many theories exist but with 
supporting and opposing evidences. In the comity of 
nations each individual country’s case is considered in 
its international and domestic circumstances and with 
all changes herein during history. Without understanding 
what are the motivations of states to aim for or refrain 
from acquiring nuclear weapons, it is not only complicated 
to forecast nuclear proliferation dynamics, but even 
more important: it becomes difficult to develop policies 
aimed at influencing these dynamics. To achieve this we 
do not require a brand new theory, but by increasing the 
insights in the large amount of existing theories on nuclear 
proliferation motivations. 
Traditionally, thinking on proliferation has been 
dominated by the realist camp which considers nuclear 
weapons valuable states and according to this only strong 
supply side control measures can stop the world’s natural 
tendency toward rampant proliferation. Over the years, 
the realist approach proved a poor guide to the realities 
of nuclear proliferation and then came the idealist camp 
which takes a different approach particularly to the 
demand side of the proliferation equation and became 
increasingly prominent in academic circles and in the 
policy world. To succeed the idealists are exploring the 
question of the demand for the bomb at three levels of 
analysis: international, domestic, and individual. For 
this purpose, apart from realist and idealist approaches, 
several theories were developed and divided into groups 
by various scholars. For example, a rather early study 
on proliferation motives by George Quester, dating from 
1973, counted three groups of them (i) military motives; 
(ii) political motives; and (iii) economic motives (Quester, 
1973). Scott Sagan in 1996 also developed a grouping 
of three “models” explaining why states wish to build 
nuclear weapons: (i) security; (ii) domestic politics; and 
iii) norms (Sagan, 1996). Further groupings on why states 
go for nuclear were given by Etel Solingen (2007), and by 
Joseph Cirincione in the same. However, the latest work 
on grouping for going nuclear was done by William Potter 
and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova in 2010. They summarized 
the group of all theories on nuclear weapon’s motivations 
into these four categories: (i) security; (ii) international 
institutions; (iii) international norms; and (iv). domestic 
circumstances. These groups are sufficient proof that not 
only the amount of theoretical groups differ, but also their 
content. On the basis of existing theories on motivations 
for nuclear weapons, four major factors have been counted: 
i. Capabilities;
ii. Security;
iii. International Norms and Perceptions; and 
iv. Domestic Politics Context (Meer, 2016).
2. CAPABILITIES
In general nuclear weapons are not easy to develop, 
nor are the materials that are required cheap and 
commonly available. Under this umbrella are brought 
the technological and economic capabilities to develop 
nuclear weapons. In this regard the most challenging and 
costly is the production of fissile materials. Transforming 
the nuclear materials into reliable and deliverable 
weapon is another challenge that requires highly 
advanced technologies, expertise, and the same applies 
to developing the delivery systems for the weapons, 
and perhaps, this is why states prefer ballistic missiles 
(Erickson, 2001). It is also argued that the technological 
and financial capabilities required for developing 
nuclear weapons are an effective barrier specially to less 
developed countries without an advanced scientific and 
technological infrastructure and without the financial 
strength to afford the investments needed to start a nuclear 
weapon programme (Keck, 2013).
Earlier in the first decade of nuclear weapons 
existence, it was generally assumed that any state would 
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like to have nuclear weapons, simply because these 
weapons were the most advanced and powerful military 
tools available. The idea was also supported by Stephen 
Meyer in mid-1980s and according to him the only 
determining factor becomes technology (Meyer, 1984). 
However, the factor failed to get a status of “principle”. 
It has no solid answer to the question—when a state 
has the means available to build nuclear weapons, why 
should it refrain specially when it is rather easy to 
convert civilian nuclear energy technology programmes 
into military ones (Baker, 1976). But a more heavy-
weight logic against the factor was that many countries 
have become technologically and economically able to 
develop nuclear weapons, but never did so. In a nutshell, 
it may be assumed that the capabilities factor is still 
important in determining motivations to pursue or forgo 
nuclear weapons, even though it may not be a decisive 
factor on its own. In circumstances, the availability of 
capabilities to develop nuclear weapons may compel 
the leadership of a state to start a nuclear weapons 
programme. On the other hand, a lack of technological 
and / or economical means may force state leaders with 
a wish for nuclear weapons to abstain from starting 
a nuclear weapons programme-although this is still a 
choice with its own motivations, because it could always 
be a possibility to start acquiring the capabilities needed, 
even when this requires tough choices on how to spend 
limited state budgets (Neil, 2009). In recent past the 
importance and relevance of capability factor has been 
faded forcefully since Pakistan and North Korea-both 
relatively poor countries acquired nuclear weapons in 
1998 and 2006 respectively. 
3. SECURITY 
Since the beginning of research on dynamics of nuclear 
power, it has been and continues to be a dominant theory 
on motivations for states to pursue nuclear weapons. The 
realist school of thinking and several others consider 
the world as an anarchy. In this anarchy, the states are in 
continuous competition and will only be able to survive 
as an independent state by “self help”, which can be 
summarized as individualistic behaviour aiming for 
its own power and benefits and thus strengthening its 
position in comparison with other states. In the context 
there is a strong pro-nuclear power weapon attitude 
while considering the ultimate survival, because this 
powerful tool will provide the best security guarantee 
against any external aggression. The only condition for 
having a successful nuclear deterrent is that the nuclear 
weapons arsenal should be so capacious that it cannot 
be totally destroyed by a surprise attack (White, 1996). 
In fact all states wish for nuclear weapons to be able 
to ensure their survival within the current international 
anarchy system. Although most realist thinkers agree 
that developing nuclear weapons is not easy, cheap or 
without risk, yet at the same time they acknowledge 
that only states with actual, pressing security problems 
will actively pursue nuclear weapons (Paul, 2000). Here 
is also to mention the other side of the coin in which 
sometimes acquiring nuclear weapons may be a bigger 
threat to a state’s security because a weapon programme 
may cause more distrust and tension among adversaries 
than would be the case without a nuclear weapon 
programme. An adversary state may feel so threatened 
by the nuclear weapon programme that it will launch a 
military attack to prevent its adversary from acquiring 
them. In the worst case the adversary state may react 
by developing nuclear weapons itself, thus creating a 
nuclear arms race and causing even more insecurity 
and instability in the region. In the situation, the realists 
argue, states often refrain from starting a nuclear weapon 
programme.
However, in contrast to the facts given in favour of 
realist theory, many examples can be found of states in 
intense conflict situations that never started a nuclear 
weapon programme. This variant was most popular 
during the “Cold War” days which emphasises the 
importance of security alliances and even up to now 
many analysts favour the alliance explanation to account 
for nuclear nonproliferation. In this variant states may 
also chose another option: seeking for an alliance with a 
nuclear weapon state that is willing to promise nuclear 
retaliation in case of the non-nuclear ally will be attacked. 
This kind of security guarantee, often called a “nuclear 
umbrella” or “positive security assurance”. It makes a 
nation’s nuclear weapon programme less necessary and 
the costs, difficulties, and risks associated with it can 
be avoided (Tertrais, 2001). But there is always a risk 
and this extended deterrence may not work in the case 
of conventional military threats. Thus, the core of this 
contradiction is that friends today may become enemies 
tomorrow (Hymans, 2006). Under this strategy states 
go for the bomb themselves and thus avoid any pleasant 
surprises. 
In addition, there is a concept of Neo-realist theory, 
developed since the 1970s, combines the importance of 
security guarantees with the dimension of the international 
system: whether the system is unipolar, bipolar, or 
multipolar will influence the value of security guarantees. 
In a bipolar world like the Cold War era, security 
guarantees by one of the two superpowers will generally 
solve any security concern of other states. In a multipolar 
world which arose after the end of the Cold War, the 
stabilizing role of security guarantees by the superpowers 
is loosened because these superpowers themselves 
have become less powerful (Mearsheimer, 1990). In a 
multipolar world states tend to start their own nuclear 
programmes more easily. However, specially since the 
1990s the concept of “opacity,” “latency” or “ambiguity” 
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has become more popular in nuclear proliferation studies. 
In this concept nations develop nuclear weapons without 
testing them or at least develop the means to be able to 
build nuclear weapons in a very short timeframe. This 
is called threshold capacity” —it takes little time to 
pass the threshold of nuclear weapon possession. In a 
balanced view, in the context, many analysts recognize 
the perceptions of external insecurity among state 
leadership are necessary conditions for decisions to start 
a nuclear weapons programme, but this condition alone 
is inadequate for explaining these decisions and other 
motivational factors have to be combined with the security 
motive (Rothstein, 1966). 
4 .  I N T E R N AT I O N A L N O R M S  A N D 
PERCEPTIONS
This category of motivational factor includes various 
theories focusing on the role of perceptions among 
states on the influence that nuclear weapon could 
have their position in the international community. On 
the one hand, these perceptions can be influenced by 
internationally shared norms that make the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons less attractive-especially those norms 
institutionalized in international treaties like the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). On the other hand, some 
of these perceptions may make nuclear weapons more 
favourable, because states may consider these weapons 
as increasing their status and prestige. Especially the 
prestige as a factor of influence on proliferation has 
been acknowledged by many. The norms theory in (non) 
proliferation studies claims that decisions regarding 
nuclear weapons serve important symbolic functions, 
depending on the perceived identity of the state. Decisions 
in this regard are determined by deeper norms and beliefs 
about what is legitimate and appropriate in international 
relations. The first and foremost effect of NPT as Jacques 
Hymans (2006) says, 
Most states think of themselves as, and want to be seen as, 
good international citizens. Thanks at least in part to the non-
proliferation regime, there is today a widespread acceptance 
by states that good international citizens do not build nuclear 
arsenals. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of states have in 
fact not gone nuclear.
Not only today even before the coming into force of 
NPT, more than two-fifth of the states that possessed the 
required capability to start nuclear weapons activities did 
so. According to an estimate since 1970, less than 15% of 
the states that have the capacity to build nuclear weapons 
did actually start such a programme. Harald Muller and 
Andreas Schmidt also made strong claims on the norm 
—setting of the NPT and argued that since 1970 almost 
70% of all states that once started a nuclear weapons 
programme ended this scheme (Muller & Schmidt, 2010). 
The authors explained this phenomenon by three ways in 
which the emergence of international norms influences 
the behaviour of states. First, the non-proliferation 
norms changed the costs-benefits calculations by states. 
Because of the broad supported non-proliferation regime, 
including its verification and export control policies, 
developing nuclear weapons will be more difficult and 
costly-technically financially, and politically. Second, the 
international norms affect the national balance of power 
between groups when they differ in opinion on whether 
or not to develop nuclear weapons. Third, according to 
Muller and Schmidt most importantly, the international 
norms change the assumptions about what is appropriate 
state behaviour.
In the context several analysts raise the warn on the 
ground that it is difficult to prove a casual relationship 
between support for the NPT and the restraint of capable 
states to develop nuclear weapons. They argued that 
the states that ratified the NPT simply did not intend to 
develop weapons before hand, instead of signing the NPT 
under pressure of the norm while actually wishing for 
nuclear weapons. Critics of the norms theory put forward 
that determined proliferators will do whatever it takes to 
acquire nuclear weapons and in that case international 
norms are probably the least obstacle. Today there are 
examples to prove that the NPT does not stop states from 
acquiring nuclear weapons automatically to do so. North 
Korea, Iran and Syria are instances of states that ratified 
the NPT but still started a nuclear weapon programme 
(Dunn, 2009). However, the non-proliferation regime has 
made nuclear weapons programmes less visible because 
states wishing for these weapons behave more secretly 
than before. 
Contrary to the “negative” norms which prohibit states 
for going nuclear there are also “positive” norms which 
offer prestige and great power status to nuclear power 
states. Many scholars including Agatha Wong-Frazer 
describes the possession of nuclear weapon as a token 
entitling the holder to claim a certain major power status 
(Wong-Frazer, 1980). This kind of positive perceptions 
of nuclear weapons is regularly labeled as “symbolism,” 
because the weapons are not regarded positively because 
of their actual usefulness as military weapons but more 
because of their symbolic value. And danger for going to a 
state in favour of nuclear programme for military purposes 
exists as long as states adhere to these positive norms 
which include-status, prestige, diplomatic leverage and 
international bargaining power (Sauer, 2011). In addition, 
just like the non-proliferation norms, positive norms are 
also linked to a state’s identity, self image, desired position 
in the international community and to “gain attention”. 
When a state wants to be taken seriously by other states 
but has little to offer, pursuing nuclear weapons or the 
demonstrated intention to acquire them is a sure way to 
attract attention and it may lead to diplomatic, political 
and economic benefits for the doing states.
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5. DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONTEXT
The last and fourth cluster of factors influencing 
nuclear weapon motivations is directly related to the 
domestic political context and international situation-
security, treaties, norms etc has nothing to do with it. 
Even by adding the word political, the role of other 
domestic factors like, culture, geographical situation or 
technological capabilities has been denied. Although 
scattered mention on domestic factors is found in the 
literature on (non-) proliferation dynamic, focusing on 
domestic political factors as drivers for decisions to 
acquire or forgo nuclear weapons is relatively a new 
branch on nuclear-related research. The domestic political 
context has several dimensions such as, domestic turmoil, 
regime pessimism, the type of regime, the importance of 
the psychological profile of state leaders, influence of elite 
groups and civilian nuclear power bureaucracies. It is all 
included under the umbrella of political domestic context 
and all dimensions within this factor are based on national 
political circumstances and dynamics that influence the 
decision to pursue or forgo nuclear weapons.  
In domestic political context domestic turmoil is 
perceived as threatening the power of the state leadership. 
States facing domestic tensions may use a nuclear weapon 
programme and the international condemning reactions on 
it as a method of diversion. Nuclear weapons programmes 
may respond to, or even bolster, nationalist sentiments 
and international negative reactions may cause a “rallying 
around the flag” effect, ending domestic dissensions for 
some time. By diverting public attention from unfavorable 
domestic issues, the regime could strengthen its position 
(Dong & Gartzke, 2007). Related to the domestic 
turmoil aspect, as considered by Kurt Campbell, regime 
pessimism works as a factor of potential influence 
on nuclear weapons proliferation. According to him 
especially ‘‘States in decline” tend to consider developing 
nuclear weapons because often they suffer from a kind 
of societal insecurity over future economic and security 
pitfalls. In that kind of situation the regime pessimism of 
states may use a nuclear weapons programme to prevent 
the state sinking into oblivion or being overshadowed by 
rival states (Campbell, 2004). In recent literatures, too, 
these factors are being emphasized. 
In another grouped factor in this category is the regime 
type of countries. In International Relations there exist a 
number of studies suggesting that democracies are less 
likely to engage in armed conflict against each other 
compared to autocracies. It is generally believed that 
abiding by international law and its established norms is 
normal behaviour in the international society of states. 
But in comparison totalitarian states with a power-seeking 
or paranoid leadership are more likely to breach their 
obligations openly or clandestinely (Muller & Schmidt, 
2010). However, on the other hand some authors also 
maintained that democracies tend to be slightly more 
inclined to pursue nuclear weapons, because democratic 
leadership may be more vulnerable to use a nuclear 
weapons programme to boost their popularity among 
nationalist population, because they wish to be re-elected-
something about which a dictator does not need to worry. 
In the context of a relatively early study conducted by 
Richard Betts, he especially focused on states with an 
isolated position in the international community which 
generally is authoritarian states. Another pioneering 
research after a long gap (2007) also focused on the 
political-ideological orientation of state leadership 
regarding the economic integration of their state in the 
international system. When a state leadership is aiming 
for economic growth and prosperity by international 
trade, it will have much to lose if it decides to acquire 
nuclear weapons. On the other, if the state leaders are not 
interested in the economic integration of their country in 
the international system will have less to lose by acquiring 
nuclear weapons. In his study, Solingen concluded that 
nuclear programmes are less likely to emerge in countries 
where the political culture is in general sympathetic 
to economic openness, trade liberalization, foreign 
investments, and international economic integration 
(Solingen, 2007). At large, in the cluster of domestic 
political context of two different groups of domestic 
actors are seen as influential: political leaders themselves 
as well as societal group having the ability to somehow 
influence the political leadership. 
In further and recent study Jacques Hymans, has 
focused on the importance of the psychological profile 
of state leaders on decisions to acquire or forgo nuclear 
weapons. In the context he argued that especially 
state leader’s conceptions of the national identity are 
the most influential factor regarding these decisions. 
Hymans developed four categories of state leader’s 
profiles: oppositional nationalist, oppositional subalterns, 
sportsmanlike nationalists, and sportsmanlike subalterns 
and concluded that state leaders with the psychological 
profile of the oppositional nationalist-characterized by 
a mixture of fear and pride-are most likely to decide 
to acquire nuclear weapons (Hymans, 2006). In line 
the “domestic elite theory” was first provided by Peter 
Pringle and James Spigelman in 1981 and later by Peter 
Lavoy who clearly links the domestic elite factor to the 
security issue and describes the process of domestic elites 
influencing nuclear weapons decision making as “nuclear 
mythmaking (Lavoy, 2006). Once a state has started 
civilian nuclear programme, the role of civilian nuclear 
power bureaucrats naturally become important as well as 
relevant. 
CONCLUSION AND PROSPECT 
To conclude, the set of factors may provide insight to 
anyone who got lost in the academic debate on nuclear 
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(non-) proliferation motivation, and could especially 
be helpful to analysts and policy makers who deal 
with potential current or future proliferating states. In 
larger as well as specific cases, states’ nuclear weapons 
programmes are not a static process. These national 
policies are part of a constantly evolving situation, and 
international policies aimed at influencing such issues 
should match this dynamism as well. They need to be 
sufficiently fluid to cover the starts, stops, setbacks 
and shifts that comprise any state’s nuclear weapons 
(non-)acquisition policy. Intuitively, security is the 
most important driving nuclear acquisition, but it is not 
in a position to explain why others are not. This lack 
of consensus on the causes of nuclear acquisition and 
forbearance has serious consequences for global non-
proliferation policy, and decisionmakers are limited in 
their ability to identify the policies most likely to deter 
other states from acquiring the bomb. 
In fact, the spread of nuclear weapons is a dynamic 
process in which the interests of several states to interact 
and the likelihood of proliferation are largely determined 
by the strategic interaction between a state deciding 
whether to acquire nuclear weapons and its adversaries. 
This interaction is shaped by the potential proliferators 
ability to defer a preventive strike on its nuclear 
programme prior to acquiring the bomb. This ability, 
in turn, hinges on the proliferators relative power and 
whether it benefits from the protection of a powerful ally. 
The higher the potential proliferators relative power, the 
greater the likelihood that it will proliferate unimpeded 
whenever it deems the security benefit of proliferation to 
be worth the cost of a nuclear programme. 
However, in the sphere of theories that motivate a state 
going for nuclear or not is a complex one and it largely 
depends on various theories/influencing factors in which 
a state takes this crucial decision. While researchers and 
analysts are making in-depth studies in a fact finding 
approach, states acquiring nuclear weapon or on its 
threshold, are presenting more challenges before them. 
In the context, a continuous going-on research process 
on why a state favours nuclear weapons while others not 
is needed to make the study on theories of nuclear going 
more effective and purposeful to ensure disarmament and 
peace in the world. 
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